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Abstract
This paper focuses on learning transferable adversarial
examples specifically against defense models (models to de-
fense adversarial attacks). In particular, we show that a
simple universal perturbation can fool a series of state-of-
the-art defenses.
Adversarial examples generated by existing attacks are
generally hard to transfer to defense models. We observe
the property of regional homogeneity in adversarial per-
turbations and suggest that the defenses are less robust to
regionally homogeneous perturbations. Therefore, we pro-
pose an effective transforming paradigm and a customized
gradient transformer module to transform existing pertur-
bations into regionally homogeneous ones. Without explic-
itly forcing the perturbations to be universal, we observe
that a well-trained gradient transformer module tends to
output input-independent gradients (hence universal) bene-
fiting from the under-fitting phenomenon. Thorough exper-
iments demonstrate that our work significantly outperforms
the prior art attacking algorithms (either image-dependent
or universal ones) by an average improvement of 14.0%
when attacking 9 defenses in the black-box setting. In
addition to the cross-model transferability, we also verify
that regionally homogeneous perturbations can well trans-
fer across different vision tasks (attacking with the seman-
tic segmentation task and testing on the object detection
task). The code is available here: https://github.
com/LiYingwei/Regional-Homogeneity .
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks are demonstrated vulnerable to ad-
versarial examples [55], crafted by adding visually imper-
ceptible perturbations to clean images, which casts a se-
curity threat when deploying commercial machine learning
systems. To mitigate this, large efforts have been devoted to
adversarial defense [7, 13, 36, 43, 44, 49, 52], via adversar-
ial training [32, 37, 56, 62], input transformation [11, 21] or
randomization [34, 61].
The focus of this work is to attack defense models, espe-
cially in the black-box setting where models’ architectures
and parameters remain unknown to attackers. In this case,
the adversarial examples generated for one model, which
possess the property of “transferability”, may also be mis-
classified by other models. To the best of our knowledge,
learning transferable adversarial examples for attacking de-
fense models is still an open problem.
Our work stems from the observation of regional homo-
geneity on adversarial perturbations in the white-box set-
ting. As Figure 1(a) shows, we plot the adversarial pertur-
bations generated by attacking a naturally trained Resnet-
152 [23] model (top) and an representative defense one
(i.e., an adversarially trained model [37, 62]). It suggests
that the patterns of two kinds of perturbations are visually
different. Concretely, the perturbations of defense models
reveal a coarser level of granularity, and are more locally
correlated and more structured than that of the naturally
trained model. The observation also holds when attacking
different defense models (e.g., adversarial training with fea-
ture denoising [62], see Figure 1(b)), generating different
types of adversarial examples (image-dependent perturba-
tions or universal ones [50], see Figure 1(c)), or tested on
different data domains (CT scans from NIH pancreas seg-
mentation dataset [46], see Figure 1(d)).
Motivated by this observation, we suggest that region-
ally homogeneous perturbations are strong in attacking de-
fense models, which is especially helpful to learn transfer-
able adversarial examples in the black-box setting. Hence,
we propose to transform the existing perturbations (those
derive from differentiating naturally trained models) to the
regionally homogeneous ones. To this end, we develop a
novel transforming paradigm (see Figure 2) to craft region-
ally homogeneous perturbations, and accordingly a gradient
transformer module (see Figure 3), to encourage local cor-
relations within the pre-defined regions.
The proposed gradient transformer module is quite light-
weight, with only 12 + 2K trainable parameters in total,
where a 3 × 3 convolutional layer (bias enabled) incurs 12
parameters and K is the number of region partitions. Ac-
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Figure 1. Illustration of region homogeneity property of adversarial perturbations by white-box attacking naturally trained models (top row)
and adversarially trained models (bottom row). The adversarially trained models are acquired by (a) vanilla adversarial training [37, 62],
(b) adversarial training with feature denoising [62], (c) universal adversarial training [50], and (d) adversarial training [37] for medical
image segmentation [65].
cording to our experiments, it leads to under-fitting (large
bias and small variance) if the module is trained with a large
number of images. In general vision tasks, an under-fitting
model is undesirable. However in our case, once the gra-
dient transformer module becomes quasi-input-independent
(i.e., aforementioned large bias and small variance), it will
output a nearly fixed pattern whatever the input is. Then,
our work is endowed with a desirable property, i.e., seem-
ingly training to generate image-dependent perturbations,
yet get the universal ones. We note our mechanism is dif-
ferent from other universal adversarial generations [38, 42]
as we do not explicitly force the perturbation to be univer-
sal.
Comprehensive experiments are conducted to verify the
effectiveness of the proposed regionally homogeneous per-
turbation (RHP). Under the black-box setting, RHP suc-
cessfully attacks 9 latest defenses [21, 26, 32, 37, 56, 61, 62]
and improves the top-1 error rates by 21.6% in average,
where three of them are the top submissions in the NeurIPS
2017 defense competition [30] and the Competition on
Adversarial Attacks and Defenses 2018. Compared with
the state-of-the-art attack methods, RHP not only outper-
forms universal adversarial perturbations (e.g., UAP [38]
by 19.2% and GAP [42] by 15.6%), but also outperforms
image-dependent perturbations (FGSM [18] by 12.9%,
MIM [14] by 12.6% and DIM [14, 63] by 9.58%). The
achievement over image-dependent perturbations is espe-
cially valuable as it is known that image-dependent pertur-
bations generally perform better as they utilized informa-
tion from the original images. Since it is universal, RHP
is more general (natural noises are not related to the target
image), more efficient (without additional computational
power), and more flexible (e.g., without knowing the tar-
get image, people can stick a pattern on the lens to attack
artificial intelligence surveillance cameras).
Moreover, we also evaluate the cross-task transferability
of RHP and demonstrate that RHP generalizes well in cross-
task attack, i.e., attacking with the semantic segmentation
task and testing on the object detection task.
2. Related Work
Black-box attack. In black-box setting, attackers cannot
access the target model. A typical solution is to generate
adversarial examples with strong transferability. Szegedy et
al. [55] first discuss the transferability of adversarial exam-
ples that the same input can successfully attack different
models. Taking advantage of transferability, Papernot et
al. [40, 41] examine constructing a substitute model to at-
tack a black-box target model. Liu et al. [35] extend the
black-box attack method to a large scale and successfully
attack an online image classification system clarifai.com.
Based on one of the most well-known attack methods, Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [18], its iteration-based ver-
sion (I-FGSM) [29], Dong et al. [14], Zhou et al. [64],
Xie et al. [63] and Li et al. [31] improve the transferability
by adopting momentum term, smoothing perturbation, in-
put transformation, and model augmentation, respectively.
[4, 42, 60] also suggest to train generative models for creat-
ing adversarial examples.
Besides transfer-based attacks, query-based [5, 9] and
decision-based [1, 20] attacks are also in the field of black-
box attack. However, these families of methods need to
access model outputs and query the target models for a
large number of times. For example, Guo et al. [20] limit
the search space to a low-frequency domain and fool the
Google Cloud Vision platform with an unprecedented 1000
model queries.
Universal adversarial perturbations. Above are all
image-dependent perturbation attacks. Moosavi-Dezfooli et
al. [38] craft universal perturbations which can be directly
added to any test images to fool the classifier with a high
success rate. Poursaeed et al. [42] propose to train a neural
network for generating adversarial examples by explicitly
feeding random noise to the network during training. Af-
ter obtaining a well-trained model, they use a fixed input
Ig gˆ + Iˆadv L
∇IL(I,y;θ)
ε · sign(·) L(·,y;θ)
Gradient Transformer Module
Figure 2. Schematic illustration of the transforming paradigm,
where I is an original image with the ground truth label y, and the
gradient g is computed from the naturally trained model θ. Our
work learns a gradient transformer module from g to gˆ.
to generate universal adversarial perturbations. Researchers
also explore to produce universal adversarial perturbations
by different methods [27, 39] or on different tasks [24, 42].
All these methods construct universal adversarial perturba-
tions explicitly or data-independently. Unlike them, we pro-
vide an implicit data-driven alternative to generate universal
adversarial perturbations.
Defense methods. Xie et al. [61] and Guo et al. [21] break
transferability by applying input transformation such as ran-
dom padding/resizing [61], JPEG compression [15], and to-
tal variance minimization [48]. Injecting adversarial exam-
ples during training improves the robustness of deep neural
network, termed as adversarial training. These adversarial
examples can be pre-generated [32, 56] or generated on-
the-fly during training [26, 37, 62]. Adversarial training is
also applied to universal adversarial perturbations [2, 50].
Tsipras et al. [57] suggested, for an adversarially trained
model, loss gradients in the input space align well with hu-
man perception. Shafahi et al. [50] also have a similar ob-
servation on the universal adversarially trained models.
Normalization. To induce regionally homogeneous per-
turbations, our work resorts to a new normalization strat-
egy. This strategy appears similar to some normalization
techniques, such as batch normalization [25], layer normal-
ization [3], instance normalization [58], group normaliza-
tion [59], etc. While these techniques aim to help the model
converge faster and speed up the learning procedure for dif-
ferent tasks, the goal of our work is to explicitly enforce the
region structure and build homogeneity within regions.
3. Regionally Homogeneous Perturbations
As shown in Section 1, regionally homogeneous per-
turbations appear to be strong in attacking defense mod-
els. To acquire regionally homogeneous adversarial exam-
ples, we propose a gradient transformer module to gen-
erate regionally homogeneous perturbations from existing
regionally non-homogeneous perturbations (e.g., perturba-
tions in the top row of Figure 1). In the following, we
detail the transforming paradigm in Section 3.1 and the
g kernel
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Figure 3. Structure of the gradient transformer module, which has
a newly proposed Region Norm (RN) layer, 1 × 1 convolutional
layer (bias enabled) and identity mapping. We insert four probes
(a, b, c and d) to assist analysis in Section 3.3 and Section 4.2.
core component called gradient transformer module in Sec-
tion 3.2, respectively. In Section 3.3, we observe an under-
fitting phenomenon and illustrate that the proposed gradi-
ent transformer module becomes quasi-input-independent,
which benefits crafting universal adversarial perturbations.
3.1. Transforming Paradigm
To learn regionally homogeneous adversarial perturba-
tions, we propose to use a shallow network T , which we
call gradient transformer module, to transform the gradients
that are generated by attacking naturally trained models.
Concretely, we consider Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) [18] which generates adversarial examples by
Iadv = I +  · sign (∇IL(I, y; θ)) , (1)
where L is the loss function of the model θ, and sign(·) de-
notes the sign function. y is the ground-truth label of the
original image I . FGSM ensures that the generated adver-
sarial example Iadv is within the -ball of I in the L∞ space.
Based on FGSM, we build pixel-wise connections via
the additional gradient transformer module T , so that we
may have regionally homogeneous perturbations. There-
fore, Eqn. (1) becomes
Iadv = I +  · sign (T (∇IL(I, y; θ); θT )) , (2)
where θT is trainable parameter of gradient transformer
module T , and we omit θT where possible for simplifica-
tion. The challenge we are facing now is how to train the
gradient transformer module T (·) with the limited super-
vision. We address this by proposing a new transforming
paradigm illustrated in Figure 2. It consists of four steps, as
we 1) compute the gradient g = ∇IL(I, y; θ) by attacking
the naturally trained model θ; 2) get the transformed gradi-
ent gˆ = T (g; θT ) via the gradient transformer module; 3)
construct the adversarial image Iˆ by adding the transformed
perturbation to the clean image I , forward Iˆ to the same
model θ, and obtain the classification loss L(Iˆadv, y; θ); and
4) freeze the clean image I and the model θ, and update
the parameters θT of T (·; θT ) by maximizing L(Iˆadv, y; θ).
The last step is implemented via stochastic gradient ascent
(e.g., we use the Adam optimizer [28] in our experiments).
With the new transforming paradigm, one can potentially
embed desirable properties via using the gradient trans-
former module T (·), and in the meantime, keep a high er-
ror rate on the model θ. As we will show below, T (·) is
customized to generate regionally homogeneous perturba-
tions specially against defense models. Meanwhile, since
we freeze the most part of the computation graph and leave
a limited number of parameters (that is θT ) to optimize, the
learning procedure is very fast.
3.2. Gradient Transformer Module
With the transforming paradigm aforementioned, we in-
troduce the architecture of the core module, termed as gra-
dient transformer module. The gradient transformer mod-
ule aims at increasing the correlation of pixels in the same
region, therefore inducing regionally homogeneous pertur-
bations. As Figure 3 shows, given a loss gradient g as the
input, the gradient transformer module T (·) is defined as
gˆ = T (g; θT ) = RN (conv(g)) + g, (3)
where conv(·) is a 1 × 1 convolutional layer and RN(·) is
the newly proposed region norm layer. θT is the module
parameters, which goes to the region norm layer (γ and
β below) and the convolutional layer. A residual connec-
tion [23] is also incorporated. Since RN(·) is initialized
as zero [19], the residual connection allows us to insert the
gradient transformer module into any gradient-based attack
methods without breaking its initial behavior (i.e., the trans-
formed gradient gˆ initially equals to g). Since the initial gra-
dient g is able to craft stronger adversarial example (com-
pared with random noises), the gradient transformer module
has a proper initialization.
The region norm layer consists of two parts, including a
region split function and a region norm operator.
Region split function splits an image (or equivalently, a
convolutional feature map) into K regions. Let r(·, ·) de-
note the region split function. The input of r(·, ·) is a
pixel coordinate while the output is an index of the region
which the pixel belongs to. With a region split function,
we can get a partition {P1, P2, ..., PK} of an image, where
Pk = {(h,w) | r(h,w) = k, 1 ≤ k ≤ K}.
In Figure 4, we show 4 representatives of region split
functions on a toy 6×6 image, including 1) vertical partition
(h,w) = w, 2) horizontal partition r(h,w) = h, 3) grid
partition r(h,w) = bh/3c+ 2bw/3c, and 4) slash partition
(parallel to an increasing line with the slope equal to 0.5).
Region norm operator links pixels within the same region
Pk, defined as
yi = γkx¯i + βk, x¯i =
1
σk
(xi − µk), (4)
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Region Norm
W
H
C
(e)
Figure 4. Toy examples of region split functions, including (a) ver-
tical partition, (b) horizontal partition, (c) grid partition, and (d)
slash partition. (e) illustrates the region norm operator with the
region split function (a), where C is the channel axis, H and W
are the spatial axes. Each pixel indicates anN -dimensional vector,
where N is the batch size.
where xi and yi are the i-th input and output, respectively.
And i = (n, c, h, w) is a 4D vector indexing the features
in (N,C,H,W ) order, where N is the batch axis, C is the
channel axis, and H and W are the spatial height and width
axes. We define Sk as a set of pixels that belong to the
region Pk, that is, r(h,w) = k.
µk and σk in Eqn. (4) are the mean and standard devia-
tion (std) of the kth region, computed by
µk =
1
mk
∑
j∈Sk
xj ,
σk =
√
1
mk
∑
j∈Sk
(xj − µk)2 + const,
(5)
where const is a small constant for numerical stability. mk
is the size of Sk. Here mk = NC|Pk| and | · | is the cardi-
nality of a given set. In the testing phase, the moving mean
and moving std during training are used instead. Since we
split the image to regions, the trainable scale γ and shift β
in Eqn. (4) are also computed per-region.
We illustrate the region norm operator in Figure 4(e). To
analyze the benefit, we compute the derivatives as
∂L
∂βk
=
∑
j∈Sk
∂L
∂yj
,
∂L
∂γk
=
∑
j∈Sk
∂L
∂yj
x¯j ,
∂L
∂xi
=
1
mkσk
(mk
∂L
∂x¯i
−
∑
j∈Sk
∂L
∂x¯j
− x¯i
∑
j∈Sk
∂L
∂x¯j
x¯j),
(6)
where L is the loss to optimize, and ∂L∂x¯i =
∂L
∂yi
· γk. It is
not surprising that the gradient of γ or β is computed by
all pixels in the related region. However, the gradient of
a pixel with an index i is also computed by all pixels in
the same region. More significantly in Eqn. (6), the second
term,
∑
j∈Sk
∂L
∂x¯j
, and the third term, x¯i
∑
j∈Sk
∂L
∂x¯j
x¯j , are
shared by all pixels in the same region. Therefore, the pixel-
wise connections within the same region are much denser
after inserting the region norm layer.
Comparison with other normalizations. Compared with
existing normalizations (e.g., Batch Norm [25], Layer
Norm [3], Instance Norm [58] and Group Norm [59]),
which aims to speed up learning, there are two main differ-
ence: 1) the goal of Region Norm is to generate regionally
homogeneous perturbations, while existing methods mainly
aim to stabilize and speed up training; 2) the formulation of
Region Norm is splitting an image to regions and normalize
each region individually, while other methods do not have
spatial operations.
3.3. Universal Analysis
By analyzing the magnitude of four probes (a, b, c, and
d) in Figure 3, we observe that |b| >> |a| and |c| >> |d|
in a well-trained gradient transformer module (more results
in Section 4.2). Consequently, such a well-trained module
becomes quasi-input-independent, i.e., the output is nearly
fixed and less related to the input. Note that the output is
still a little bit related to the input which is the reason why
we use “quasi-”.
Here, we first build the connection between that obser-
vation and under-fitting to explain the reason. Then, we
convert the quasi-input-independent module to an input-
independent module in order to generate universal adver-
sarial perturbations.
Under-fitting and the quasi-input-independent module.
People figure out the trade-off between bias and variance
of a model, i.e., the price for achieving a small bias is a
large variance, and vice versa [6, 22]. Under-fitting oc-
curs when the model shows low variance (but inevitable
bias). An extremely low variance function gives a nearly
fixed output whatever the input, which we term as quasi-
input-independent. Although in the most machine learning
situation people do not expect this case, the quasi-input-
independent function is desirable for generating universal
adversarial perturbation.
Therefore, to encourage under-fitting, we go to the oppo-
site direction of preventing under-fitting suggestions in [17].
On the one hand, to minimize the model capacity, our gra-
dient transformer module only has (12 + 2K) parameters,
where a 3 × 3 convolutional layer (bias enabled) incurs 12
parameters and K is the number of region partitions. On
the other hand, we use a large training data set D (5k im-
ages or more) so that the model capacity is relatively small.
We then will have a quasi-input-independent module.
From quasi-input-independent to input-independent.
According to the analysis above, we already have a quasi-
input-independent module. To generate a universal adver-
sarial perturbation, following the post-process strategy of
Poursaeed et al. [42], we use a fixed vector as input of the
module. Then following FGSM [18], the final universal per-
turbation will be ~u = ·sign(T (~z)), where ~z is a fixed input.
Recall that sign(·) denotes the sign function, and T (·) de-
notes the gradient transformer module.
4. Experiments
In this section, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the
proposed regionally homogeneous perturbation (RHP) by
attacking a series of defense models.
4.1. Experimental Setup
Dataset and evaluation metric. We randomly select 5000
images from the validation set of ILSVRC 2012 [12] to
evaluate the transferability of attack methods.
As for the evaluation metric, we use the improvement of
top-1 error rate after attacking, i.e., the difference between
the error rate of adversarial images and that of clean images.
Attack methods. For performance comparison, we repro-
duce five representative attack methods, including fast gra-
dient sign method (FGSM) [18], momentum iterative fast
gradient sign method (MIM) [14], momentum diverse in-
puts iterative fast gradient sign method (DIM) [14, 63],
universal adversarial perturbations (UAP) [38], and the
universal version of generative adversarial perturbations
(GAP) [42]. If not specified otherwise, we follow the de-
fault parameter setup in each method respectively.
To keep the perturbation quasi-imperceptible, we gener-
ate adversarial examples in the -ball of original images in
the L∞ space. The maximum perturbation  is set as 16 or
32. The adversarial examples are generated by attacking a
naturally trained network, Inception v3 (IncV3) [54], Incep-
tion v4 (IncV4) or Inception Resnet v2 (IncRes) [53]. In the
default setting, IncV3 is used and  = 16.
Defense methods. As our method is to attack defense
models, we reproduce nine defense methods for per-
formance evaluation, including input transformation [21]
through total variance minimization (TVM), high-level rep-
resentation guided denoiser (HGD) [32], input transforma-
tion through random resizing and padding (R&P) [61], three
ensemble adversarially trained models (Incens3, Incens4 and
IncResens) [56], adversarial training with project gradient
descent white-box attacker (PGD) [37, 62], adversarial log-
its pairing (ALP) [26], and feature denoising adversarially
trained ResNeXt-101 (FD) [62].
Among them, HGD [32] and R&P [61] are the rank-1
submission and rank-2 submission in the NeurIPS 2017 de-
fense competition [30], respectively. FD [62] is the rank-1
submission in the Competition on Adversarial Attacks and
Defenses 2018. The top-1 error rates of these methods on
our dataset are shown in Table 1.
Defenses TVM HGD R&P Incens3 Incens4 IncResens PGD ALP FD
Error Rate 37.4 18.6 19.9 25.0 24.5 21.3 40.9 48.6 35.1
Table 1. The error rates (%) of defense methods on our dataset which contains 5000 randomly selected ILSVRC 2012 validation images.
Implementation details. To train the gradient transformer
module, we randomly select another 5000 images from the
validation set of ILSVRC 2012 [12] as the training set. Note
that the training set and the testing set are disjoint.
For the region split function, we choose r(h,w) = w as
default, and will discuss different region split functions in
Section 4.4. We train the gradient transformer module for
50 epochs. When testing, we use a zero array as the input of
the gradient transformer module to get universal adversarial
perturbations, i.e. the fixed input ~z = ~0.
4.2. Under-fitting and Universal
To verify the connections between under-fitting and uni-
versal adversarial perturbations, we change the number of
training images so that the models are supposed to be under-
fitting (due to the model capacity becomes low compared to
large dataset) or not. Specifically, we select 4, 5k or 45k im-
ages from the validation set of ILSVRC 2012 as the train-
ing set. We insert four probes a, b, c, and d in the gradient
transformer module as shown in Figure 3 and compare their
values in Figure 5 with respect to the training iterations.
When the gradient transformer module is well trained
with 5k or 45k images, we observe that: 1) c overwhelms d,
indicating the residual learning branch dominates the final
output, i.e., gˆ ≈ c; and 2) b overwhelms a, indicating the
output of the convolutional layer is less related to the input
gradient g. Based on the two observations, we conclude that
the gradient transformer module is quasi-input-independent
when the module is under-fitted by a large number of train-
ing images in this case. Such a property is beneficial to gen-
erate universal adversarial perturbations (see Section 3.3).
When the number of training images is limited (say 4
images), we observe that b does not overwhelm a, indicating
the output of the convolutional layer is related to the input
gradient g, since a small training set cannot lead to under-
fitting.
This conclusion is further supported by Figure 5(c):
when training with 4 images, the performance gap between
universal inference (use a fixed zero as the input of the gra-
dient transformer module) and image dependent inference
(use the loss gradient as the input) is quite large. The gap is
reduced when using more data for training. Figure 5(c) also
illustrates 5k images are enough for under-fitting. Hence,
we set the size of the training set to 5k in the following ex-
periments.
To provide a better understanding of our implicit uni-
versal adversarial perturbation generating mechanism, we
present an ablation study by comparing our method with
other 3 strategies of generating universal adversarial per-
turbation with the same region split function. The com-
pared includes 1) RP: Randomly assigns the Perturbation
as + and − for each region; 2) OP: iteratively Optimize
the Perturbation to maximize classification loss on the nat-
urally trained model (the idea of [38]); 3) TU: explicitly
Trains a Universal adversarial perturbations. The only dif-
ference between TU and our proposed RHP is that random
noises take the place of the loss gradient g in Figure 2 (fol-
lowing [42]) and are fed to the gradient transformer mod-
ule. RHP is our proposed implicitly method, and the gra-
dient transformer module becomes quasi-input-independent
without taking random noise as the training input.
We evaluate above four settings on IncResens, the error
rates increase by 14.0%, 19.4%, 19.3%, and 24.6% for RP,
OP, TU, and RHP respectively. Since our implicit method
has a proper initialization (discussed in Section 3.2), we ob-
serve that our implicit method constructs stronger universal
adversarial perturbations.
4.3. Transferability toward Defenses
We first conduct the comparison in Table 2 when the
maximum perturbation  = 16 and 32, respectively.
A first glance shows that compared with other represen-
tatives, the proposed RHP provides much stronger attack
toward defenses. For example, when attacking HGD [32]
with  = 16, RHP outperforms FGSM [18] by 24.0%,
MIM [14] by 19.5%, DIM [14, 63] by 14.9%, UAP [38]
by 24.9%, and GAP [42] by 25.5%, respectively. Second,
universal methods generally perform worse than image-
dependent methods as the latter can access and utilize the
information from the clean images. Nevertheless, RHP,
as a universal method, still beats those image-dependent
methods by a large margin. At last, we observe that our
method gains more when the maximum perturbation  be-
comes larger.
The performance comparison is also done when gener-
ating adversarial examples by attacking IncV4 or IncRes.
Here we do not report the performance of GAP, because the
official code does not support generating adversarial exam-
ples with IncV4 or IncRes. As shown in Table 3 and Table 4,
RHP still keeps strong against defense models. Meanwhile,
it should be mentioned that when the model for generat-
ing adversarial perturbations is changed, RHP still gener-
ates universal adversarial examples. The only difference is
that the gradients used in the training phase are changed,
which then leads to a different set of parameters in the gra-
dient transformer module.
4.4. Region Split Functions
In this section, we discuss the choice of region split func-
tions, i.e., vertical partition, horizontal partition, grid parti-
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Figure 5. Universal analysis of RHP. In (a), we plot the ratio of the number of variables in probe pairs (a, b) satisfying that |b| > 10|a|
to the total number of variables when training with 4, 5k or 45k images. In (b), we plot the case of |c| > 10|d|. In (c), we compare
the performance of universal (denoted by -U) inference and image dependent inference (denoted by -I) by varying the number of training
images (4, 5k or 45k).
Methods TVM HGD R&P Incens3 Incens4 IncResens PGD ALP FD
FGSM [18] 21.9/45.3 2.84/20.7 6.80/13.9 10.0/17.9 9.34/15.9 6.86/13.3 1.90/12.8 17.0/32.3 1.62/13.3
MIM [14] 18.2/37.1 7.30/18.7 7.52/13.7 11.4/17.3 10.9/16.5 7.76/13.6 1.36/6.86 15.3/24.4 1.00/7.48
DIM [14, 63] 21.9/41.0 11.9/32.1 12.0/21.9 16.7/26.1 16.2/25.0 10.8/19.6 1.84/7.70 15.5/24.7 1.34/8.22
UAP [38] 4.78/12.1 1.94/11.3 2.42/6.66 1.00/7.82 1.80/8.34 1.88/5.60 0.04/1.04 7.98/11.5 -0.1/0.40
GAP [42] 18.5/50.1 1.34/37.9 3.52/26.9 5.48/33.3 4.14/29.4 3.76/22.5 1.28/10.2 15.6/30.0 0.56/11.1
RHP (ours) 33.0/56.9 26.8/57.5 23.3/56.1 32.5/60.8 31.6/58.7 24.6/57.0 2.40/25.8 17.8/39.4 2.38/24.5
Table 2. The increase of error rates (%) after attacking. The adversarial examples are generated with IncV3. In each cell, we show the
results when the maximum perturbation  = 16/32, respectively. The top 3 rows (FGSM, MIM and DIM) are image-dependent methods
while the bottom 3 rows are (UAP, GAP and RHP) are universal methods.
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Figure 6. Performance comparison among four split functions, in-
cluding vertical partition, horizontal partition, grid partition and
slash partition.
tion and slash partition (parallel to an increasing line with
the slope equal to 0.5). Figure 6 shows the transferabil-
ity to the defenses, which demonstrates that different re-
gion split functions are almost equivalently effective and all
are stronger than our strongest baseline (DIM). Moreover,
we observe an interesting phenomenon as presented in Fig-
ure 7.
In each row of Figure 7, we exhibit the universal adver-
sarial perturbation generated by a certain kind of region split
functions, followed by the top-3 categories to which the
generated adversarial examples are most likely to be mis-
classified. For each category, we show a clean image as
an exemplar. Note that our experiments are about the non-
targeted attack, indicating the target class is undetermined
and solely relies on the region split function.
As can be seen, the regionally homogeneous perturba-
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Figure 7. Four universal adversarial perturbations generated by
different region split functions, and the corresponding top-3 tar-
get categories.
tions with different region split functions seem to be tar-
geting at different categories, with an inherent connection
Methods TVM HGD R&P Incens3 Incens4 IncResens PGD ALP FD
FGSM [18] 22.4/46.3 4.00/21.1 8.68/15.1 10.1/18.3 9.72/17.4 7.58/14.7 2.02/12.8 17.3/32.1 1.42/13.4
MIM [14] 20.1/40.4 10.0/23.9 10.2/17.4 13.4/20.3 13.1/19.0 9.96/16.6 1.50/7.54 14.8/25.1 1.24/8.18
DIM [14, 63] 22.7/42.9 16.3/37.1 14.7/25.0 18.7/28.6 17.9/26.5 13.6/22.1 1.82/8.02 15.2/24.8 1.62/8.74
UAP [38] 6.28/18.2 1.42/9.94 2.42/6.52 2.08/7.68 1.94/6.92 2.34/6.78 0.28/2.12 10.1/15.9 0.16/1.18
RHP (ours) 37.1/58.4 23.4/59.8 20.2/57.6 27.5/60.3 26.7/62.5 21.2/58.5 2.20/29.7 20.3/42.1 1.90/31.8
Table 3. The increase of error rates (%) after attacking. The adversarial examples are generated with IncV4. In each cell, we show the
results when the maximum perturbation  = 16/32, respectively. The top 3 rows (FGSM, MIM and DIM) are image-dependent methods
while the bottom 2 rows are (UAP and RHP) are universal methods.
Methods TVM HGD R&P Incens3 Incens4 IncResens PGD ALP FD
FGSM [18] 20.6/44.1 5.34/22.3 10.1/15.8 11.7/19.4 10.5/17.2 10.4/16.3 2.06/13.8 17.5/32.6 1.72/14.7
MIM [14] 20.3/39.4 15.0/28.1 13.4/22.1 17.4/24.6 15.1/22.5 13.6/22.6 1.84/8.80 12.3/25.9 1.62/9.48
DIM [14, 63] 24.6/44.0 23.7/44.1 22.5/34.5 25.8/37.1 22.4/33.7 20.2/32.5 2.36/9.26 12.6/25.9 1.78/10.1
UAP [38] 7.10/24.7 2.14/10.6 2.50/8.36 1.88/8.28 1.74/7.22 1.96/8.18 0.40/3.78 7.12/17.0 -0.1/3.06
RHP (ours) 37.1/57.4 26.9/62.1 25.1/61.4 29.7/62.3 29.8/63.3 26.8/62.8 2.20/28.3 22.8/43.5 2.20/32.2
Table 4. The increase of error rates (%) after attacking. The adversarial examples are generated with IncRes. In each cell, we show the
results when the maximum perturbation  = 16/32, respectively. The top 3 rows (FGSM, MIM and DIM) are image-dependent methods
while the bottom 2 rows are (UAP and RHP) are universal methods.
between the low-level cues (e.g., texture, shape) they share.
For example, when using grid partition, the top-3 target cat-
egories are quilt, shower curtain, and container ship, respec-
tively, and one can observe that images in the three cate-
gories generally have grid-structured patterns.
Motivated by these qualitative results, we have a prelim-
inary hypothesis that the regionally homogeneous pertur-
bations tend to attack the low-level part of a model. The
claim is not supported by a theoretical proof, however, it in-
spires us to test the cross-task transferability of RHP. As
it is a common strategy to share the low-level CNN ar-
chitecture/information in multi-task learning systems [47],
we conjecture that RHP can well transfer between different
tasks (see below).
4.5. Cross-task Transferability
To demonstrate the cross-task transferability of RHP, we
attack with the semantic segmentation task and test on the
object detection task.
In more detail, we attack a semantic segmentation model
(an Xception-65 [10] based deeplab-v3+ [8]) on the Pas-
cal VOC 2012 segmentation val [16], and obtain the ad-
versarial examples. Then, we take a VGG16 [51] based
Faster-RCNN model [45], trained on MS COCO [33] and
VOC2007 trainval, as the testing model. To avoid test-
ing images occurred in the training set of detection model,
the testing set is the union of VOC2012 segmentation val
and VOC2012 detection trainval, then we remove the
images in VOC2007 dataset. The baseline performance of
the clean images is mAP 69.2. Here mAP score is the aver-
age of the precisions at different recall values.
As shown in Table 5, RHP reports the lowest mAP with
object detection, which demonstrates the stronger cross-
Attacks - FGSM MIM DIM RHP (ours)
mAP 69.2 43.1 41.6 36.2 31.6
Table 5. Comparison of cross-task transferability. We attack seg-
mentation model and test on the detection model Faster R-CNN,
and report the value of mAP (lower is better for attacking meth-
ods). “-” denotes the baseline performance without attacks.
task transferability than the baseline image-dependent per-
turbations, i.e., FGSM [18], MIM [14], and DIM [14, 63].
5. Conclusion
By white-box attacking naturally trained models and
defense models, we observe the regional homogeneity of
adversarial perturbations. Motivated by this observation,
we propose a transforming paradigm and a gradient trans-
former module to generate the regionally homogeneous per-
turbation (RHP) specifically for attacking defenses. RHP
possesses three merits, including 1) transferability: we
demonstrate that RHP well transfers across different mod-
els (i.e., black-box attack) and different tasks; 2) universal:
taking advantage of the under-fitting of the gradient trans-
former module, RHP generates universal adversarial exam-
ples without explicitly enforcing the learning procedure to-
wards it; 3) strong: RHP successfully attacks 9 representa-
tive defenses and outperforms the state-of-the-art attacking
methods by a large margin.
Recent studies [32, 62] show that the mechanism of some
defense models can be interpreted as a “denoising” proce-
dure. Since RHP is less like noise compared with other
perturbations, it would be interesting to reveal the prop-
erty of RHP from a denoising perspective in future works.
Meanwhile, although evaluated with the non-targeted at-
tack, RHP is supposed to be strong targeted attack as well,
which requires further exploration and validation.
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A. Number of Regions
In this section, we study the effect of K, the number of region partitions. Specifically, we split the image into 1196,
598, 299, 150, 100, 75, 50, 38, 25, 17, 8 or 4 regions. We show the learned universal perturbations in Figure 8. Due to the
limitation of GPU memory, we study at most 1196 regions. The performance comparison is presented in Table 6. We observe
that for stronger defenses (e.g., PGD [37] and FD [62]), the optimal value of K is relatively small. We explain that these
strong defenses have stronger ability to denoise (Some work [32, 62] interprets the defense procedure as denoising), while
the perturbations with small K are less like a noise, thereby serving as strong perturbations for the strong defenses.
B. Quantitative Universal Results
Besides the quantitative results included in the main manuscript, we show some qualitative results in Figure 9. Specifically,
we show and compare the perturbations generated by universal inference (use a fixed zero as the input of the gradient
transformer module) and image-dependent (use the loss gradient as the input) inference via using the gradient transformer
module trained with different numbers of images. We arrive at the same conclusion as the main manuscript, i.e., the gradient
transformer module becomes quasi-input-independent when training with a large number of images (e.g., 5k images or more).
(a) 1196 regions (b) 598 regions (c) 299 regions (d) 150 regions (e) 100 regions (f) 75 regions
(g) 50 regions (h) 38 regions (i) 25 regions (j) 17 regions (k) 8 regions (l) 4 regions
Figure 8. Regionally homogeneous universal perturbations with different number of region partitions.
#regions TVM [21] HGD [32] R&P [61] Incens3 [56] Incens4 [56] IncResens [56] PGD [37] ALP [26] FD [62]
1196 32.9 24.6 21.4 30.4 29.6 21.5 1.88 19.0 1.68
598 34.0 27.2 23.1 32.1 32.0 24.4 1.86 19.2 1.86
299 33.0 26.8 23.3 32.5 31.6 24.6 2.40 17.8 2.38
150 37.1 25.5 23.3 31.0 30.6 24.0 2.06 20.3 1.84
100 37.2 23.9 20.8 26.2 26.7 22.3 2.10 18.8 2.50
75 39.0 25.3 20.9 26.5 26.6 24.3 2.66 19.8 2.84
50 33.5 19.0 19.0 22.2 24.7 20.1 3.26 17.1 3.06
38 26.4 11.0 11.9 14.9 14.2 11.7 3.88 14.6 3.62
25 28.3 15.6 16.4 17.3 20.2 18.1 3.32 19.1 3.04
17 21.0 7.82 8.86 9.02 9.32 9.26 3.20 11.8 3.16
8 4.90 0.66 1.28 1.52 1.26 0.76 1.34 3.14 0.88
4 5.92 0.80 1.18 0.12 0.66 1.26 1.34 7.26 1.06
Table 6. The increase of error rates (%) after attacking. The adversarial examples are generated with IncV3. In each row, we show the
performance when splitting the images into a different number of regions.
4 images, img. dep. 5k images, img. dep. 45k images, img. dep.
4 images, universal 5k images, universal 45k images, universal
Figure 9. A comparison of perturbations between image dependent inference (img. dep.) and universal inference (universal) when training
with 4, 5k or 45k images. In the case of “4 images”, the difference between image dependent inference and universal inference is large,
while that is small when training with more images.
